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The present article aims to study the governmental strategies to control the 
popular uprisings that marked the year of 2011 in the Middle Eastern region. Its main 
concern will be considering the immediate state answer to the protests witnessed in the 
countries in that region and studying the impact of such answer on the regimes‟ 
stability. To better analyze the different patterns of interaction between the government 
and the people and the ways the former tries to control and undermine the latter's 
insurrection initiatives, this paper will focus on two different cases and try to point out 
the factors that influenced the outcomes witnessed. The comparison will be first 
centered in the mechanisms employed by the states and it will deal later with the 
possible reasons for their success or failure. 
In the first section, the Tunisian case will be explored, mainly through a historical 
and political approach. The roots of instability, the fast growth of the unrest, the weak 
and unsuccessful state attempts to control the mobilization, and the overthrow of the 
President are the main points to be analyzed. After that, the Jordanian successful 
maintenance of stability will be discussed, pointing out elements that have played major 
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roles in the undermining of the moderated protests in the kingdom. The reasons for the 
long-term stability of this monarchy will be the focus of the analysis. 
The events covered in the case studies starts at the countries‟ independence and 
goes to the major demonstrations in 2010 and 2011. This choice was made so as to 
comprehend the creation of the countries‟ current state apparatus its consolidation and 
its answer to political challenges, especially the recent demonstrations. .This article 
aims to analyze how two Middle Eastern countries dealt with the Arab Spring and shed 
more light to the studies on the different effects of this phenomenon 
 
The Tunisian Republic 
The territory that nowadays belongs to Tunisia was inhabited and dominated by 
different peoples throughout its history. The domination by Ottomans and the later 
French imperialism were the two last periods in which the Tunisian people was formally 
controlled by foreign forces. However, the regimes that followed the country‟s 
independence on March 20
th
 1956 were far different from the dream of freedom, which 
was witnessed in the Tunisian struggle against  French domination and later against the 
Bey regime in 1957 (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2012b). 
Habib Bourguiba, who was the main leader of the Tunisian independence 
movement, ruled without focusing on the people‟s needs, and the stability of his 30-year 
presidency was based mainly on the initially good economic results that graced the 
whole Middle Eastern region until the 1970s and 1980s. The international crisis that 
started in 1973 and the policies adopted to solve its socioeconomic consequences were 
responsible for a wave of discontentment in most Middle Eastern countries, including 
Tunisia. In 1987 the prime-minister, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, seized the power after the 
former President was declared unfit to rule, in what was later called a “bloodless coup” 
(IHS JANE'S, 2009). 
Ben Ali‟s government managed to control people‟s unrest and diminish its 
unfortunate socioeconomic conditions for some time. However, many of the bad 
political practices of the former President have been kept, such as fraudulent elections -
in which Ben Ali never obtained less than 80% of the votes-, and repression of the 
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opposition (IHS JANE'S, 2009). The deterioration of work and social conditions in the 
country led to a new outbreak of protests at the end of 2010, started by the self-
immolation of an unemployed young man. The proliferation of the protests finally led 
Ben Ali to flee Tunisia and seek asylum in Saudi Arabia on January 14
th
 2011. 
The Tunisian constitution sets the bases for a Presidential republic, in which the 
President is the head of both state and government. Elections were being held every five 
years for the presidency, and the maximum number of terms, formerly three, was 
extinguished in 2004, allowing Ben Ali to reach his fifth term in 2009, before being 
toppled. The elections‟ results had been constantly accused of fraud by the opposition, 
and the discontentment with the regime only grew bigger, with an important factor 
being Ben Ali‟s dispute with the Islamist groups and the banishment of Islamist parties 
(US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2012b). The former President increased his 
unpopularity with Muslim groups by reinforcing the banishment of the hijab in public 
offices and by persecuting even moderated Islamic groups. 
According to the rentier state
2
 definition (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987), Tunisia 
cannot be classified at first glance as a rentier state, since its oil reserves are not 
extensive. However, the effects of the rise in oil prices, such as a greater flow of aid 
from oil-rich Arab countries, allowed Tunisia to maintain some rentier state practices. 
The maintenance of Ben Ali‟s rule, and previously Burguiba‟s, relied strongly on 
neopatrimonialist practices. Ben Ali‟s government was marked by patronage and 
nepotism, which were used in order to ensure that the main political posts were filled by 
men -and sometimes women- of his trust and to pay for their loyalty to the regime. 
Therefore, his wife‟s and his own families were the main controllers of the political and 
business sectors in Tunisia (HIBOU; HULSEY, 2006).  
A second element that contributed to the stability of the regime was the 
maintenance of certain levels of economic prosperity and stability, obtained by Ben 
                                                 
2
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action, since the people is strongly dependent on subsidies and other kinds of aid provided by the central 
government (BEBLAWI, 1987, LUCIANI, 1987). 
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Ali‟s policies (BELLIN, 2004). These were successful in providing the middle class the 
encouragement not to turn against the government. Another important factor that 
contributed to the regime survival was the strong repression of the most different 
opposition elements. Ben Ali and his cabinet tried to control all aspects of civil society 
through security-motivated reasons. The alleged purpose of containing terrorism was 
used to condemn and dismantle opposition groups. Similar reasons were employed to 
pass a law in 1998 that turned the membership in all NGO mandatorily open. This law 
was used against the Tunisian Humans Rights League (LTDH), one of the main 
denouncers of the Human Rights violations performed by the old regime (IHS JANE'S, 
2009). 
The first governmental answer to the December 2010 protests was a strong 
repression through the military and the police. Censorship against national and foreign 
press was also intensified, reaching the internet and the virtual social networks, 
appointed by some as a facilitator of the opposition movement (KOPLOW, 2011). 
However, this strategy proved soon to be ineffective as the military refused to continue 
attacking the people, and the protests got stronger. Since the Tunisian military 
expenditures were traditionally very low, and its main officers were kept in a very 
distant position from the political decision-making center, this sector did not have any 
strong encouragement to defend the regime. Besides, Ben Ali also tried to keep the 
military weak as to reduce the threat it might represent to his rule (COOK, 2011). 
With the protests‟ escalation, the government soon had to change its strategy, 
starting to make concessions and promises to the people. First, Ben Ali tried to increase 
the people‟s expectations towards his regime by promising more jobs and the release of 
political detainees, both promises being really vague in terms of their implementation. 
The failure of this attempt led him to deal with his regime, first pledging not to seek a 
sixth term, then promising earlier elections. Finally, his last measure was to sack all his 
ministers in an attempt to show his commitment to a new regime, turning against his 
main supporters (THE ECONOMIST, 2011). However, his rule was unsustainable and 
two days later he fled to Saudi Arabia. 
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The revolutionary process in Tunisia, beginning with the self-immolation in 
December 17
th
, reached its main result in four weeks, lasting until the elections were 
assured, and the maintenance of elements from Ben Ali‟s rule was avoided. The 
protests‟ strength was very impressive, as the Tunisian regime was seen as one of the 
most stable in the Middle East. However, some elements that might not have been 
usually verified to create that impression might explain the success of the “Jasmine 
Revolution”. For example, the lack of religious legitimacy, being this element fiercely 
fought by Ben Ali and his party, turned it easy for the protesters to change from their 
normal passive position toward strong rebellious actions (KOPLOW, 2011). The failure 
of the Tunisian government‟s attempts to undermine the opposition was not witnessed 
in the Jordanian case, which will be examined in the following section. 
 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
After the Ottoman defeat in World War I, the former territory of its Empire was 
divided and put under the League of Nations mandate system. The mandate over the 
region that now belongs to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was given to the United 
Kingdom, together with what now correspond to Israel, Gaza, Jerusalem and the West 
Bank. The mandate was by then called Palestine and Transjordan and lasted until 1922, 
when the UK divided the two regions, creating the Emirate of Transjordan, under the 
semiautonomous rule of the Hashemite Prince Abdullah. The Hashemites are a family 
which is originally from the Saudi Arabian region of Hejaz and which is believed to be 
Prophet Muhammad‟s direct descendent. The Prince‟s rule was successful in 
maintaining stability, allowing him to maintain his rule when in 1946 the British 
mandate over Transjordan was finished, creating the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Transjordan (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2012a). 
Through the 1946 Constitution, the former emirate became a constitutional 
monarchy, with constitutionally ensured great competences to the executive power. 
Jordan was on the Palestinian side in the defense of its sovereignty and throughout the 
wars against Israel. In 1949 the West Bank was put under the rule of Jordan, deepening 
one of the main issues in the Jordanian internal politics, the strong presence of 
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Palestinians and the consequent disputes between its two main social groups, East and 
West Bankers, for political influence and benefits (RATH, 1994). The kingdom‟s name 
was then changed in order to include the new people who were incorporated to the state, 
becoming the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, name that lasts until the present. 
The opposition grew stronger with time, being the inclusion of West Bankers and 
other Palestinians held by many accountable for this phenomenon. This growth of 
pressure from the opposition, together with the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951 
and the transfer of power to the palace group
3
, led to some changes in the political 
system, culminating in the adoption of a new Constitution on January 2
nd
 1952 (RATH, 
1994). The 1952 Constitution
4
  granted more power and important freedoms to the 
Jordanian people and established the current political system in Jordan (RATH, 1994, 
CIA, 2012a). 
During King Hussein‟s reign, Abdullah‟s grandson, Jordan joined the other Arab 
countries in their fight against Israel and for the Palestine cause. During the Six-Days 
War in 1967, Jordan lost the control over the West Bank and its part of Jerusalem to 
Israel. However, the flow of Palestinian refugees only grew stronger (BRYNEN, 1992). 
The 1980s crisis also inflicted important effects on Jordan, which was forced to make 
some economic policy changes following the IMF encouraged program. The 
socioeconomic effects of these measures were just as catastrophic in Jordan as in 
Tunisia, and so, the deeply affected lower classes protested against their poor standards 
of living in what became known as the bread riots. These social movements were 
responded by the government with economic measures in order to improve its 
population‟s conditions. Even though the people claimed almost exclusively for better 
economic conditions, the government, in a cautionary move, promoted some kind of 
political liberalization with the king‟s compromise with the transfer of some 
                                                 
3
 The palace group was composed by traditional allies of the monarchy. During the period that followed 
the assassination of King Abdullah, his oldest son, Talal, was the official monarch, but the general 
climate in the kingdom was of uncertainty, granting influence to the palace group. This atmosphere was 
dissolved when Talal‟s son, Hussein, became King in 1953 (RATH, 1994). 
4
 The Constitution of 1952 lasted until today, but was subject of many amendments (US DEPARTMENT 
OF STATE, 2012a).  
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competences to the other powers and with the concession of more independence to 
those (WIKTOROWICZ, 2000). 
Hussein‟s reign was marked by an increasing alignment with Western forces, 
mainly the US, and, even though it was not so well received by some sectors of the 
population, the economic benefits that this relation allowed were important to ensure 
economic and, thus, political stability. His succession was marked by some dispute 
between his brother and his son, but the latter triumphed and managed to gain the 
support from the former‟s followers. King Abdullah II, who is still in power, kept many 
of his father‟s policies and promised to continue and deepen the economic and political 
opening process his father started (ANDONI, 2000). 
The Jordanian political system gives the executive power the authority to sign and 
execute all laws. Even though the Parliament has the capacity of overriding his veto 
power in the law formulation process, if two thirds of both houses agree on that, the 
Parliament can be dissolved by the monarch (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2012a). 
The main sources of legitimacy of the Jordanian King are based on its religious 
importance, since his family is claimed to be direct descendent from the Prophet 
himself, and the maintenance of economic stability. The main movements of opposition 
so far have focused on the improvement of social and economic conditions, but seldom 
treated political structural questions with greater strength. However, the Hashemite 
Kings have been implementing what was called “defensive democratization”, at least 
since the riots of 1989, creating an overall atmosphere of good will from the monarch 
towards the not so strongly manifested aspirations of the people for more freedom 
(ROBINSON, 1998). 
Nevertheless, the instruments of control of the social mobilization used by the 
monarchy are very strong. First of all, even though Jordan cannot be classified as a full 
rentier state, because of its scarce oil reserves, the normal practices of rentier states in 
the domestic level are extensively used in Jordan, also because of the effect of external 
aid from, initially, Arab countries and later also Western powers, turning Jordan into a 
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so-called induced allocative state
5
 (BRYNEN, 1992). Therefore, social elements such as 
patronage and neopatrimonialism are strongly present in the Jordanian society. Much of 
the opposition to the regime has been so far co-opted into the government. 
Besides the co-optation of challengers to its rule, the Jordanian political regime 
has also developed strong juridical systems to turn the organization of any kind of 
political opposition increasingly difficult. The Law of Public Meetings “stipulates that 
individuals must obtain permission to hold public meetings, defined as „any meeting 
called to discuss political affairs‟" (WIKTOROWICZ, 2000, p. 50). Meanwhile, the 
Law of Societies and Social Organizations, besides establishing composition 
requirements for any social organization, requests all kinds of groupings to register in 
the ministry that tackles the affairs they allegedly discuss (WIKTOROWICZ, 2000). 
Through both laws, the government creates bureaucratic means of controlling the social 
mobilization in the country, imposing obstacles to a free civil society. 
The Arab Spring protests were also present in Jordan, since the economic 
grievances other Arab countries‟ populations face are also a problem in the kingdom. 
However, the protests in Jordan did not focus on the King or its regime, but rather 
blamed the Prime Minister, Samir al-Rifai, who was very unpopular among the 
Jordanians, for their grievances and called for new economic policies. The way politics 
are conducted in Jordan allows the citizens to criticize the government without 
criticizing the regime, nor the King, even though the latter is the real responsible for the 
measures taken and the real power-holder (DANIN, 2011). 
The state response to the protests incurred seldom in physical violence. Even 
though very strong measures were taken, such as the dissolution of the Parliament, the 
King refused to allow violent crackdowns against his population, since he did not want 
to relate his reign to unnecessary extreme violence (YOM, 2011a). This can partly 
explain the reason why the protests do not focus on the end of monarchy. However, 
some authors believe that the people also fear that a change of focus towards the end of 
                                                 
5
 Allocative states are states that develop strategies that are similar to rentier states‟, but whose resources 
to undertakes such measures come from rentier states, having, therefore, more trouble to sustain rentier 
policies (LUCIANI, 1987). 
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the monarchical system in Jordan might have led to a stronger and more violent attack 
against the protesters (FOREIGN POLICY, 2011).  
The main strategy consisted in undermining the motivations for protesting, co-
opting the main protesters and, more importantly, making concessions to the popular 
demands and promising policies to promote better life conditions. The position of Prime 
Minister was twice emptied in the 2011: first Samir Rifai and his whole cabinet were 
fired in February
6
; then, it was the turn of his successor, Marouf al-Bakhit, who did not 
manage to satisfy the popular demands and was also sacked in October (YOM, 2011b). 
Besides, each change of Prime Minister was followed by strong promises of new 
policies. First, the government committed to grant more subsidies and raises to civil 
salaries; then, it was promised that the ban on access to some websites from government 
offices would be ceased, and that the Law of Public Meetings would be softened. 
However, these pledges were not completely fulfilled (DUDLEY, 2011). The main 
concession to the protests was the adoption of amendments to the Constitution in 
August, granting more power and freedom to the judiciary (US DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, 2012a). The protests have not set as a goal the end of Abdullah II‟s reign, and 
the government managed to keep them in a stable and not regime-threatening level.  
 
Comparison 
The analysis of both cases allows us to highlight some of the elements of the two 
countries‟ history that can be useful in understanding their current situation. Their 
different trajectories were marked by some common characteristics that can be 
described as the main elements that define politics in the Middle East. The presence of 
autocratic regimes, patrimonialist and neopatrimonialist practices, strong governmental 
control over the society, and rentier-state policies are some of the features that can be 
used to include these two countries in the Middle Eastern state model. However, even 
though Middle Eastern countries present to some degree all these characteristics, their 
                                                 
6
 The practice of sacking the Prime Minister in moment of popular unrest has also been employed by 
Abdullah II‟s father, Hussein. Interestingly Rifai‟s father, Zeid, was object of this strategy in 1989, when 
he filled the same post, and the riots resulting from the change in oil prices emerged (YOM, 2011b).  
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political scenarios are very different, and these distinctions probably play an important 
role in the definition of the outcomes to the social movements witnessed in the region.  
As stated above, even though the state legitimacy sources and strategies to 
maintain their rule strong are very different, their ways of tackling the 2011 uprisings 
were very similar. The reasons for that, however, are different: while Tunisia had to 
give up from violently responding to the protests because of the military refusal to keep 
on fighting their compatriots, Jordan avoided an aggressive crackdown of the 
manifestations so as not to encourage an image of a violent repressive state. Therefore, 
both regimes relied intensively on promises of better conditions and on symbolic 
gestures towards these promises, like sacking government officials and rescheduling 
elections for earlier periods. Both governments deployed cooptation strategies in order 
to take the main leaders of the opposition movements out of the streets. However, the 
Jordanian historical deployment of such strategies was very important in the use of this 
maneuver against the new movement, while the Tunisian inexperience in this sense 
contributed to the failure of his cooptation attempts. 
The reasons for the similarities in the strategies to put an end to the protests 
probably are influenced by the social and political backgrounds of the two countries, 
mainly the neopatrimonialist and rentier state practices and the authoritarianism of both 
regimes. However, some important motivations for the adoptions of such measures were 
caused, as explained above, by different factors in each case. This is probably one of the 
reasons why the results of the deployment of those strategies were so different in each 
case. 
When thinking about the reasons why the results of such strategies were so 
different from one country to the other, many factors have to be considered, and a scale 
of importance cannot be easily established. First of all, the sources of legitimacy of the 
regimes have to be analyzed. The Jordanian King has a strong source of legitimacy on 
its historical claim of being descendent of the Prophet. Together with the permission of 
Islamist organizations, in levels that cannot pose a threat to regime, this element leads to 
a very strong belief on the monarch‟s right to rule, and very few Jordanians dare to 
challenge this right. Similar phenomena are witnessed in the other Arab monarchies, 
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which have all resisted to the Arab Spring (SADIKI, 2012). Meanwhile, the Tunisian 
former President‟s strong struggle against the Islamist elements in its society has been 
responsible for a lack of this source of legitimacy in his regime. Therefore, when the 
situation in Tunisia deteriorated the people had no reason not to blame the President 
himself for the poor conduction of the country‟s economy and then demand a new 
government. 
King Abdullah II and his father have, at least since the riots of 1989, tried to 
maintain a good image of their reigns and a general idea of a long gradual process of 
democratization among their people. The long standing “defensive democratization” has 
been a Jordanian monarchy‟s strong characteristic (ROBINSON, 1998). This policy, 
however, never prevented the King from privileging his main supporters and from co-
opting the main opposition elements. Meanwhile, Ben Ali focused on concentrating all 
the main political positions within his circle of trust and weakening all elements seen as 
threats to his rule. This practice was also responsible for the fast change of sides 
witnessed in the military sector and its previous weak results in the crackdown of 
protests. 
Nevertheless, the promotion of a good image among the people towards the 
Jordanian monarch shall not be viewed as a simple gesture of good will, but as part of a 
bigger strategy. It shall also be mentioned that just like Tunisia, Jordan also had laws 
that tried to prevent civil society to be independent and to act towards popular goals. 
The main difference between the two states in this sense is just the formalization and the 
effectiveness of their policies. 
Jordan and Tunisia presented autocratic political systems, and their decision-
making capacities were concentrated in one individual, the Jordanian King and the 
Tunisian President. Despite that the different power structure in these countries granted 
Jordan a scapegoat strategy that did not work in the Tunisian case. Both rulers 
dismissed major officials to try to please the protesters and to encourage them to believe 
in the good will of their governors towards change and to make them leave the streets. 
However, the Jordanian system was a lot more effective in this way, as the existence of 
a Prime Minister, which is changed in determinate situations, allows the regime to 
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change same faces in the government without really changing its policies, even giving 
the population the false idea that they have the power of determining their rulers, as the 
protests were responsible for two changes of Prime Ministers within eight months. The 
same cannot be said about Tunisia, where the presidential attempt to change his cabinet 
was only a step towards his own resignation. Being the President the main public figure 
with no other figure with comparable power or public exposure, there was no one to be 
blamed for all the problems that shadowed Tunisia‟s future. 
After analyzing these variables, one can assume that the main difference between 
the two cases relies on the image they disseminate among their people, thus the 
legitimacy they can attribute to their own rule. This element is determined by all the 
other aspects discussed above and is probably one of the main causes for the different 
results of the two cases. Even though both countries deployed similar strategies to 
control the demonstrations, just Amman was able to survive the Arab Spring. There the 
claims of the opposition against the rulers was successfully tackled, and the ruler keeps 
increasing its sources of strength by broadcasting an image of good will toward the 
political liberalization process. 
 
Conclusion 
By analyzing the two Arab countries, Tunisia and Jordan, one can sure learn about 
the  interaction between government and society that are witnessed in the Middle East. 
Those two cases are representative of some of the main differences among the Arab 
countries, even though, like all comparative politics paper, this one could not elucidate 
all the aspects that define politics in those countries. However, the comparison between 
a monarchy and a republic is very important to better understand the distinct results of 
the 2011 protests over the different regimes in this region. Even though the monarchical 
system does not ensure stability to a ruler, it has proven to be helpful in the regime 
struggle to maintain itself. We should not, however, undermine the importance of 
granting legitimacy to its rule and the maintenance of an image among the people of 
good will from the ruler. We cannot say that those are the reasons for the diametrical 
results in Tunisia and Jordan, but they sure played an important role.  
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Nevertheless, we shall not completely discard the possibility of changes in the 
Jordanian political scenario, even though the current conditions do not suggest it. The 
protests there have been twice responsible for the change of Prime Minister, and new 
policies keep being promised by the state. However, it is not believed that the political 
situation will be improved so soon. The monarch still holds the power of changing the 
government as he sees fit. The current Prime Minister, Abdullah Ensour, does not have 
the power to change the system and sure will be fired if the monarch sees it as a 
necessary measure to ensure the regime continuance (YOM, 2011b, BRAND, 2011). 
Meanwhile, in Tunisia the results of the protests have pointed towards a more free and 
democratic direction. The new elections held in October 2011 witnessed the victory of 
Moncef Marzouki, one the oppositionists who were exiled during Ben Ali‟s presidency. 
The new government is marked by the inclusion of groups, which were formerly 
prohibited of taking part in the political processes (KENNER, 2011). This sure is an 
optimistic sign for the future. However, Tunisia still has to deal with the poor economic 
conditions that were responsible for the beginning of the protests, and the maintenance 
of its stability still has to be assured. In 2013 new challenges to the democratic process 
established in Tunis arose, as clashes between different social groups have been 
reported, leaving the future of Tunisia‟s regime uncertain, while 2014 has started with 
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In the year of 2011 a strong movement for change was witnessed in the Middle Eastern 
region. The strategies adopted by Tunisian and Jordan governments to control 
demonstrations and the results of these strategies are the subject of this paper. By 
studying both countries‟ history and political system, it will seek to explain how they 
employed similar strategies. By analyzing the effects of such strategies and the political 
background they were deployed in, it aims to point out reasons for the different 
outcomes witnessed. 
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Resumo 
O ano de 2011 testemunhou um forte movimento por mudança na região do Oriente 
Médio As estratégias adotadas por Tunísia e Jordânia para controlar os protestos e os 
resultados que tais estratégias alcançaram são o objeto deste artigo. Ao estudar a história 
e o sistema político dos dois países, buscar-se-á  explicar a adoção de estratégias 
similares. Ao analisar os efeitos dessas estratégias e o pano de fundo em que elas foram 
desenvolvidas, tem-se por objetivo elencar razões para a obtenção de resultados tão 
distintos. 
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